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CRITICAL STRATEGIES: NIETZSCHE'S 
USE OF METONYMY 
CLAUDE MANGJON 
1.0 The Nature of Metonymy 
Critics have pointed out 1 that contemporary discussions of 
figurative discourse focus exclusively on metaphor, neglecting 
the other tropes that belong to the traditional field of rheloric. 
This comment is equally applicable to philosophical discus-
sions of Nietzsche on the melaphoric foundation of language. 
Nietzsche himself. however. was not so restrictive. In the essay 
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, Nietzsche argues that 
metonymy2 is a key trope in the rannalian of language, and 
is itself 'responsible' for the belief in a world independent of 
any human contribution. A detailed examination of metonymy 
can also be found in the early lecture notes entitled Ancient 
Rhetoric and in the notebooks of the 1870's. It is therefore 
surprising how the literature has consistently neglected to 
examine this trope, for the value Nietzsche attributes to it 
cannot be underestimated. 
Nietzsche adopts Quintillian's definition of metonymy as the 
'substitution of the cause for which we say a thing in place of 
the thing to which we refer'}, recognising its fomlidable use for 
the rhetorician. The starting points for metonymic transferences 
are perceived effects with entities postulated as the cause of 
these effects: 'the abstracta evoke the illusion that they them· 
selves are these essences which cause the qualities, whereas they 
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receive a metaphorical reality only from us. because of those 
characteristics'.· An excellent example of a metonymic transfer-
ence is provided by Nietzsche himself: we sec a courageous man 
and argue that the abstract entity 'courage' is the cause of his 
being courageous: 'the audacia (courage) causes men to be 
audaces [courageous]'.' 
TIle nature of language is intimately related to the trope of 
metonymy: the numerous actions predicated from the realm of 
perception is transferred into a single predicate via the abslJ'aCt-
ing process of language. 'In the realm of the intellect everythina 
qualitative is merely quantitative. What leads us to quaJities is 
the concept. the word. "It is because the mechanism of language 
- in the process of constituting itself as a language - functiODI 
by removing the differences of each individual action that die 
quality is in effect the concept: a quality or concept is 1~:1 
of the negation of many quantities. It is because we have 
accustomed to taking conceptS and qualities for granted 
free ourselves from qualities only with difficulty. '7 UIl'gu"l 
obstructs us from seeing the difference and uniqueness 
thing. 
TIle emphasis on metonymy at the origins of language 
evident lhroughout the earty Nietzschean writings on lan8"" 
In Tht Philosophtr, Nietzsche refers to the view that the 
process of organising the multiplicity of perceptions and 
is conducted by 'carving' out linguistic categories and 
the named perception or action within the appropriate 
While this is the commonly held view of language in 
nineteenth century, Nietzsche uses this premise to derive 
further claim that a number of perceived actions arc 
under a qualitative name. But in addition the 'quality' is 
considered to be the cause of tl1e action. It is this diis p1ac:aIII 
from effect to cause which is metonymic: 'here we have 
ference: an abstraction holds together innumerable actiOlW 
is taken to be their cause." 
The starting point for metonymy - as for synecdocbe 
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described by Nietzsche as the perception of the 
shape or form of the thing. The perception of the form 
dUng is a distinctively human attribute: 'all shape apper-
the subject. It is the grasping of surfaces by means of 
By focusing on the fact that language is concerned 
U,. ('omlSor shapes of things, Nietzsche justifies his claim 
lie inability of our possessing knowledge of the essence of 
the tropic stage, the emphasis on the 'characteristics' is 
"",1Ur":' Nietzsche claims that it is because of the 'character-
which human beings perceive that the process of postu-
entities is set off. This is. in effect. a metaphoric process: 
perception of cenain 'characteristics' an abstract entity 
created as the cause of the 'characteristics '. It is on these 
poUJl(ls that Nietzsche accuses Plato of creating an ideal world 
• mistaken understanding of language: 'from the eide [orig-
iaalIy, shape or form of that which is seen) to idea; [idea] forms] 
by Plalo' ,10 
However, the metonymic constitution of language is not only 
• matter of perceiving the forms of things: it is also described 
as a transference from the realm of sensation to that of concept. 
In the lecture notes, Nietzsche claims, for e)(ample, that in 
unering 'the drink is bitler' we should not think of 'bitterness' 
as though it were one of the drink's essential propenies. It is 
not the drink that is the cause of the bitterness, but we who 
experience the sensation ofbiuemess and transfe r it to the drink, 
believing it to be the causa] motor. Likewise, we say' "the stone 
is hard," as if hard were something otherwise familiar to us and 
not merely a subjective stimulation. 'II Whichever the case. it is 
clear that in both sensation and perception the metonymic 
transference consists in stamng from the effect and positing an 
entity as the cause of that effect. Metonymy is the confusion of 
conceptS with things. 
The innovation in Nietzsche's considerations on the nature 
of metonymy is that he considers aU synthetic judgements to 
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be instances of metonymic transferences: here, the • 
works prove to be invaluable. for a detailed description 
this is the case is provided in the notes of The Philo,,,,, 
In deHning something according to a property which 
to it. we are in so doing neglecting other properties. a 
which Nietzsche constantly re-iterates in his 
language SO as to justify his claim that language doc" n,d 
us to essences. Properties. he argues. 'only support 
tions' .I! 
There are no properties independent of their rel:'ionsll 
the subject. and, just as there are many properties to I 
(in Nietzsche's example. a pencil can be defined aannl. 
its property of elongation. i.e .• a pencil is an elongated 
but it can also be defined as a coloured body). in lhe 
manner we find many other relations between the 
the thing. This is why. Nietzsche claims. 'relations 
be the essence (of the thing) . but only consequences 
essence. A synthetic judgemenl describes a thing: ~:~ 
its consequences. i.e .• essence and consequences b 
tifled, i.e .• a mttonymy.·)) Synthetic judgemenlS are 
a confusion between the concept and the thing: from 
(the perceived fonn) of the thing we fonnulate a coo ...... 
we believe tells us what the essence of the thing is; 
l'iiclZsche argues, is clearly not the case. for the realm 
concept and that of the thing can never be eq, ..... t 
di fh:renl spheres, between which there can never be III 
lion. are placed next 10 each other. 'I. The relationship 
both spheres is nOI one of identity. but involves a 
transference from an ontological realm to an am".""'. 
tual one. 
Given the metaphoric basis of metonymy. Nietzsche 
that the inferences by which we derive the causes 
effects are ultimately 'illogical'. The metonymic 
language reveal that rather than being the result of I 
process. ilS very nature is illogical: 'all rh,"o,';c<lIji, ... 
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the essence of language) are logically invalid inferences. Th.is 
is the way that reason begins.' U In effect. Nietzsche is using the 
nature of language to argue for the primacy of the illogical over 
the logical. In so doing. he is undennining the mark of ration-
ality and logical thinking which characterises the discouISC of 
philosophy. Since the concept has a metaphoric origin, then the 
status of philosophy as offering a rational explanation of reality 
is questionett. 
Although the 'early' texts do not auentpt to deal with the 
problems of prulosophy, they clearly bring out the direction of 
Nietzsche's ideas on language and the recognition of how an 
understanding of the workings of language could help in the 
resolution of philosophical problems. Thus. Nietzsche claims 
!hat metonymy lies at !he heart or philosophy: philOSOpheB 
select the last in a series of perceptions mistakenly transferring 
them 'into an impersonal world ' of concepts. 16 TIle abstracted 
concept becomes the cause of the properties perceived: the 
metonymic structure oflanguage is ultimately. Nietzsche argues. 
'responsible ' for the belief in the 'popular metaphysics' of 
causality. 
But it is also 'responsible' for the belief in the metaphysical 
unity of things. In the Will to POM'U NietzSChe implicitly refers 
to metonymy as a unity imposed upon 'things' . Language, in the 
process of its own self-constitution. transfonns the perceived 
effects of the thing into a concept. This is how Nietzsche 
describes metonymy: 
' we conceive all the other properties which are present and 
momentarily latent, as the cause of the emergence of one single 
propeny. i.e., we take the sum of its properties - "x" - as the 
cause of the property "x": which is utterly stupid and mad! All 
unity is unity ." as a pattern of domination that signifies a unity 
but is not a unity: 11 
A 'doubling ' process occurs, for first a property of the thing 
is selected and this, then. is posited as the cause of the other 
propenies, Metonymic transferences are based on a confusion 
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of the thing with the concept. with the latter achieving an 
identity as another k.ind of thing. 
2.0 The (unction of metonymy as a aitical instrument 
While the early writings of Nietzsche on language specify the 
nature of metonymy in a strictly rhetorical context. in the later 
works he is no longer concerned with rhetoric but with the 
application of metonymy as a critical instrument." Though 
Nietzsche no longer uses the tenninology of metonymy, the 
application of metonymy is widespread, forming the strategy 
with which he conducts his critique of philosophy, religion and 
society. The extent to which Nietzsche considers the recogniw 
liou of the role of metonymy in the discourse of philosophy 
is such that in Twilight of the Idols it is described as the mOIl 
'dangerous error' of reason, as 'reason's intrinsic form of 
corruption'.19 
Perhaps one of the clearest instances of the abuse of ...... . 
nymy is the example described by Nietzsche with reference 
the claims made by a popular personality of the time. A dielilill 
called Cornaro made the claim that a particular diet - a 
one - was the cause of a long and happy life. But Ni"IZSI:II 
claims that this is an instance of metonymic transference: it 
mistaken to start from the effect - the long and happp)y;~~': ~.: 
postulate the diet as the cause of it. Rather if we C( 
requirements of a long life - a slow metabolic rate and 
amounts of food - we notice, Nietzsche claims, that these 
precisely the characteristics suited to Cornaro's physical 
dition. It was Cornaro's physiological nature. i.e .• his 
life-requirements. that obliged him to adopt a particular 
diet. It was not a question of choice. for it was his neelll. 
dictated the kind of diet he required: 'he was not free to 
or little as he chose. his frugality was not an act of ·free 
he became ill when he ate more.·20 
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What is innovative to the later Nietl.Sche's use of metonymy 
is the insistence on the correlation between physiology and 
metonymy. 1be body is the site where the mistaking of causes 
for effects originates: 
'if a man is suffering or in a good mood. he has no doubt 
that he can find the reason for it if only he looks. So he 
looks for the reason -In truth. he carulOt find the reason. 
because he does not even suspect where he ought to look 
for it - What happens? - He takes a consequence of his 
condition for its couse; e.g., a work undertaken in a goad 
mood (really undertaken because the good mood had 
provided the courage for it) succeeds: ecco, the work is 
the reason for the good mood. - In fact, the success was 
detennined by the same thing that determined the good 
mood - by the happy co~ordination of physiological forces 
and systems. '21 
It is evident that Nietzsche gives great significance to the 
body in claiming that the externalisation of causes is the product 
of a physiological condition. Heidegger is simply mistaken 
when he argues that physiology is an effect of nihilism.22 The 
contrary is the case: 'nihilism' and 'corruption' are effects of 
physiological degeneration. 
But what is interesting is that although Nietzsche provides 
an explanation for the 'bad mood ' as the product of a 'degen~ 
erate' physiology, so too the 'good mood' is explicable in terms 
of a specific physiological condition. Thus. feeling good or bad 
depends on the functioning of lhe physiological system. on 
'every sort of restraint, pressure, tension. explosion in the play 
and counter~play of our organs, likewise and especially the 
condition of the nervus sympathicus·.23 
Given that physiology is offered as the framework within 
which to interpret feelings, moods and other psychological 
~nomena. Nietzsche argues that the introduction of psycho~ 
logical explanations to account for physiological conditions is 
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an example ofmelonymic transference. In the attempt to accoum 
for the way we feel. a rational explanation is sought. which. once 
established. is posited as the reason, the cause for feeling the 
way we do. In other words, psychological explanations are 
introduced in the anempt to explain away what is in effect I 
physiological condition. The individual who is faced with the 
need to remove a distressful situation will find some kind rA 
explanation for this situation. Since the removal of the distrell 
produces a pleasurable sensation, what is required is 'a soolhiaa. 
liberating. alleviating cause.·2A 
The function of memory is that of remembering ~~;:!~ 
causes in preference to others so as (0 get over the 
situations quickJy: what this means is that cenain 
explanations are repeatedly selected. dominating some. 
expense of others. When 'the banker thinks at once of 
ness', the Christian of 'sin'. the girl of her 'love' .'''pJe,ioollll 
externalized reasons are recalled to explain physiological 
ditions: the function of memory in this case is negative .. 
the habit of taking certain causes for granted hinden: 
investigation of the 'real' causes. Ralher than seeking 
'rea]' physiological causes. Nierzsche claims we 
'imaginary causes' as explanations: the difference 
both kinds of causes is that the fonner remain at a ph),,,.! 
therefore unconscious level. while the latter. in 
conscious. provide a rational justification for feeling 
we do. 
The intimate relationship between physiology and 
is evidently of great importance for Nietzsche. But 
intimacy is not expressed in the early writings on rtldodc 
language. it becomes a predominant feature in his 
iogs. TIle importance of this relationship cannot 
estimated. for it is on the basis of this . 
strategy for the critique of philosophy is 
what is strikingly evident is the continuous 
the early Nietzsche to the later one, where the 
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metonymy in the fonnation of language is broadened to function 
as a critical instrument. 
3.0 Applications of metonymy 
3.1 The critique of religion 
In his critique of religious morality. Nietzsche explicitly states 
that metonymic transferences are responsible for its creation: 
'one confuses cause and effect: one fails to understand decadence 
as a physiological condition and mistakes its consequences forthe 
real cause of the indisposition; example: all of reUgious morali-
ty.·26 But the focus of the critique is directed towards the priest-
type whose deteriorating physiological condition is such that it 
leads him to deny the actual world. TIle priest-type is the causal 
motor in the generation of reUgious and moral conceptS, inventing 
'imaginary causes' - God. the soul, the ego, the spirit. the free or 
unfree will- as the cause of the individual's feeling in a particular 
way. But the mistake, according to Nietzsche, is precisely that of 
neglecting the origins in the physiology of the priest·type: 'the 
preponderance of feelings of displeasure over feelings of pleasure 
is the cause of a fictitious morality and religion.·21 
Because Nietzsche knows - and he stresses the need ' to 
know. e.g .. that one has a nervous system (but no "soul") ... (as] 
... the privilege of the best infonned'28 - the physiological 
f'nmework within which both religious and mora1 propositions 
an: aniculaled, he is able to show how the pricsHype. as one 
who doesn't know the physiological basis of mora1ity. attempts 
10 provide an 'explanation' of ullpleasam general feelings: 29 
by are caused (a) by 'beings hostile to us' , by 'evil spirits'; 
(b) by actions deemed as sinful; (c) as a punistuncnt for our 
1Ctions; and (d) as a result of an WlSuccessful action. 
However, just as negative feelings are explained as physio-
consequences, the priest-type otters the same kind of 
... 1IIIlIIiolon for positive ones: thus. we find the 'explanation' of 
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pleasant general feelings as caused (a) by trusting in God; (b) 
by the awareness of a good action; (c) as a result of a suc:ce,;sf1JI, 
action; (d) by the Christian virtues of faith, hope and 
Metonymic transferences COml the basis of Nietzsche's 
the list of'explanations' involves a transference from 
to an extemallocation - renamed as something else - with 
latter posited as the cause of the sensations: 'moraJity 
religion fall entirely under the psychology of error: in 
single case cause is mistaken for effect; or the effect of 
is believed true is mistaken for the truth; or a slale of ,:a"sci,"'; 
ness is mistaken for the causation of this statc.'JO 
Revealing the metonymic basis of religious and moral 
peratives constitutes in part Nietzsche's projected ",.,sessa'" 
of values:31 the imperatives of the type 'do X actions and 
will be happy' are translated into 'if you are happy. then 
will do X actions'. Because happiness is equated with a 
physiological condition, it is physiology which becomes 
detennining factor in the individual's behaviour: 
'a well-constituted human being, a "happy one", musl 
perfonn certain actions and instinctively shrinks from. 
other actions, he transports the order of which he is the 
physiological representative into his actions with other 
human beings and things. In a fonnula: his vinue is the 
consequence of his happiness',n 
This is why Nietzsche emphasises that it is not 
'principles and dogmas' which describe our character: 
opposite is the case in that it is our 'nature that is the 
our thinking and judging thus and thus. ,J) The p.'SClipd 
propositions of morality are criticised precisely on this 
they postulate an abstract cause as the ideal towards 
must appropriate himself. But it is not a question of whaI 
ought to become but of what one is: the criterion for' 
an action is not whethe r it is an effect of a virtue or a 
whether it is an effect of physiology: 'today we no lon' ... ·lII 
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how to separate moral and physiological degeneration: the 
former is merely a symptom-complex of the latter. one is 
necessarily bad, just as one is necessarily ill',34 In showing that 
the performance of an action is not a matter of choice, Nietzsche 
cancels the distinction between being and willing: we will what 
we are, Morality is criticised not only for its lack. of understand-
ing of what is natural, but because it values that which Nietzsche 
calls 'anti-nature', sanctifying it with 'the highest honours as 
morality', )S 
Because physiology conditions particular actions, Nietzsche 
further argues that the concept of free will was invented by 
theologians to make a person accountable for his or her actions, 
the ulterior motive being that of' making mankind depelldent on 
him {theologian),,36 It is only by correlating the origin of an 
action to a person's consciousness. will, intention and motiva-
tion that the theologian is able to introduce the concept of 
punishment. But Nietzsche emphasises that the will is an effect 
of cenain stimuli: it is an 'individual reaction' without the power 
of causing anything, the will no longer 'effects' anything. no 
longer 'moves anything?7 The 'false causality' of the will is 
that of moving from the actions to the creation of a faculty (the 
will) as the cause of these actions, It is part of Nietzsche's goal 
IS an 'immoralist' to debunk. the concept of free will for it 
enables him to argue that the concept of gUilt and punishment 
are external and unwarranted impositions of religion and moral-
ity onto the human realm, 
1bis unnecessary creation of causes provides an interesting 
of the 'rudimentary psychology of the religious mall':18 
"'",wse human beings believe that all effects are caused by a 
then the feeling of extreme energy or power leads to the 
it must be caused by someone, for they are not willed 
agent in the first place, But these feelings of power are 
cbaracteristic of the 'exhausted': their 'highest activity 
~:~iS misleading for we tend to m::;take it for the life 
~ man, This. however, is not the case: the energy of 
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the exhausted is a 'degeneration effected 
spiritual and nervous discharge '.N 
The lack of physiological knowledge credits God as 
of the strong feelings induced in man: ~ concept of 
created to account for certain inexplicable sensations. In 
of knowledge. man postulates a being superior to himself 
cause of these (eeHogs: in effect. man moves from ps~;: 
to ontology: 'in the psychological concept of God, a· 
in order to appear as effect. is personified as cause. '«I 
In The Genealogy of Morals, NielZSChe introduces 
concept of the 'ascetic ideal', linking it to the ph,'siolorlc 
decline of the priesHype. When the priest rejects the 
life he does so because he considers them as the 
his suffering is an effect. But. Nietzsche argues, the 
the case, for the cause of the priest's suffering is not 
external, but internal: the ascetic ideal is a sign or 
'a partial physiological blocking and exhaustion',·1 The 
mistake is that of identifying the world as the cause of 
suffering: it is the substitution of cause and effect. i.e .. a 
mic transference. 
Despite the false interpretation of reality by the 
his role remains an integral pan of Christianity. 
the • illusion' of an 'ideaJ world'. the function of the 
is that of helping the community. The priest-type redirects 
resentment of the sufferers to an external cause. to anOth.u 
in so doing prevents their resentment from developing· 
self-destructive process. The sufferer needs 'some living 
or other on whom he can vent his feeling directly or in 
under some pretext or oth~r·.42 
Physiology is the cause of the resentment which ch,...,1afI 
the slave class: Nietzsche explains that the attribution of 
cause to an external entity - the noble class - is to be unclen. 
as the strategy by which the priest ensures survival ofh.is 
who would otherwise channel their resentment against 
selves. Thus, although Nietzsche usually considers the 
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tution of cause and effect to be mistaken, it does serve a rx>sitive 
life·enhancing role. 
lnterestingly, whereas in the early writings on language 
Nietzsche focused on the abstract Quality of the noun as mis· 
leading man in thinking it was the cause of which he was the 
effect. in the later writings the emphasis shifts from the abstract 
Quality of nouns to the psychology of man: 'the uneducated man 
belie':es that anger is the cause of his being angry, spirit the 
cause of his thinking, soul the cause of his feeling - in short 
... a mass of psychological entities'.4J 
Despite the shift of emphasis. underlying the psychic elements 
are the physiological ones. Psychology is a rationalisation of the 
physiological condition: the psychological element only explains 
why man needs to postulate the beliefin these entities. The 'naive' 
man is he who transfonns imagined causes into 'personal en· 
lities': to the Christian, God becomes the cause of man's 'hope, 
rerx>se [and] the feeling of "redemption". '44 
The entire gamut of concepts and morals introduced by 
religion are in effect an interpretation of a physiological con-
dition: it is the priest who names the defects of his physiological 
system with 'the sign-language or religio-moral idiosyncrasy -
'repentance', 'sting of conscience', 'temptation by the Devil', 
'the proximity of God' .4S Re·interpretation is part of the priest· 
type's agenda: the same physiological condition can be inter-
preted according to a particular code of behaviour •. "sin", the 
priestly version of that animal "bad conscience".·46 
It is clear that the origin of these conditions is located within 
the priest-type: he plays an imponant role in that he claims to 
know not only why man is suffering, but provides an explanation 
and offers a solution to man's pain by identifying' "guilt" [as] 
Ibe &Ole cause of his [man's] suffering'.47 Nietzsche's critique 
meals that the priest mistakenly names an abstract entity - guilt 
-IS the cause of man's suffering, whereas it is man's physio-
JDpcIl condition which is the cause of his suffering: suffering 
.. ~ted, therefore. within a religious framework. 
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3.2 The critique of consciousntss 
Several of Nietzsche's discussions of topics central to rbe 
discourse of philosophy are 1ikewise formulated along a me-
tonymic structure: he considers acts of consciousness as mit-
(Kenly involving a metonymic transference. where by startiDJ 
from the perspective of the effects. consciousness is created. 
the cause of these effects. The goal of Nieczsche's critique 
to remove the privileged position consciousness had ac<(Ui'" 
since Descartes. Consciousness. it is argued. is not the 
motor in human life. but rather an effect of the 
unconscious realm of physiology. De Man sums up N;"lZOohO 
critique as the attempt to put 'us on our guard agaiDSl 
tendency to hypostatize consciousness into an autho,i"hI 
ontological category' ,43 
The metonymic structure of consciousness is discussed 
terms of its chronological sequence. It is argued that the dlill 
ology of causality is inverted, so that 'the cause enters 
sciousness later than the effect. '4\1 The imrNlrtant poill 
Nietzsche is that the functions of consciousness -
willing, feeling. and perceiving - are effects and nDI 
whose origins can be located in consciousness. the e~::~ 
of which we are conscious are actually 'tenninal pJ 
an end - and cause nothing'.50 The extent to which . 
is attributed to consciousness is such that it is bel;ev,:d 
a satisfactory explanation of something. once the cause 
tulated as a feature of it. 
Nietzsche's critique is therefore an attempt to 
primacy of consciousness. By providing specific cases 
which have been traditionally attributed (0 c"':;:o::::: 
the discou,,", of philosophy. he hopes be can 
unconscious as primary causal motor. Thus. thinkina. 
the emotions and sense perception are subjected 
Nietzschean critique which argues that causes have 
fused with their effects. 
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TIle critique of thinking is made with reference to.the wide-
spread belief that thinking processes take place in consciousness 
with rationality as the sufficient condition for the explanation 
of thought. However, a process of what Nietzsche calls 'chron-
ological inversion' takes place: it is the error of locating the 
justification for a thought within consciousness, whereas its 
appearance in consciousness is solely an effect. The cause of a 
thought is not found in consciousness: 'we seek the reason for 
a thought before we are conscious of it' .!II The reason is pro-
jected as the cause of a thought afterwards: conscious rational 
explanations are added later: we mistakenly believe that 'the 
reason enters consciousness first' :12 
The critique of willing is directed towards the view which 
posits the will as the cause of an action. Nietzsche's argument 
is that the concept of will is formulated on a metonymic error, 
in that from an effect - the action - we postuLate consciousness 
as the cause which 'wills' the action. But it is our physiology 
which leads to our actions. not our consciousness. In addition. 
the widespread misuse of the concept of will has led to serious 
consequences: the belief in such a thing as the faculty of the will 
has led to the further belief that a 'will' also exists in the world, 
'we have from our personal experience introduced a cause into 
events in general' .'31be natural world is therefore explained on 
the basis of a causal framework. which - re-named as ' natural 
laws' - science will assume as constituting the object of its 
research. 
TIle critique of the emotions is reductionist in that psy-
chological explanations are replaced with physiological ones. 
Nietzsche argues that feelings are misunderstood physiological 
conditions which are subsequently rationalised. By looking for 
an extemaJ cause to explain the effects •. frequent rushes of blood 
to the brain accompanied by a choking sensation are illlupreted 
IS "anger": persons and things that rouse us to anger are means 
of relieving our physiological condition'.~ 'The conscious ex-
perience of an emotion is justified as the effcct of something 
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other which produces lhat effect. AJthough Nietzsche disap-
proves of the re-Iocation of the cause to the sphere of conscious-
ness, it is clear that such a move is required by some so as 10 
be able to attribute praise or blame accordingly. TIle functiCXl 
of 'fictionally' postulated external causes is therapeutic in daM 
they relieve the inclividual of his physiological distress. althouJb 
this does not negate the fact that, according to Nietzsche. Ibe 
invention of the cause of the emotions is an 'invention of C&'*I 
that do not exist'." 
The critique of perception is intended to dispel the CORllDl:. 
sense view that the 'outer world' is the cause of our perceptkD 
of the world being what they are. Rather it is the 'inner wodd' 
'.vhich conditions OUf perceptions of the 'outer world': 
fragment of outcr world of which we are conscious is born 
an effect from outside has impressed itself upon us, and 
subsequently projected as its 'cause',XiThe metonymic ""'diI 
eoee consists in projecting the effect of a perception as the 
of that perception: it is an error peculiar to mankind 
believes that an explanation has been provided when the 
is located within the sphere of consciousness. But this iJ 
cisely the point of Nietzsche's critique: to locate the 
factor we must consider the 'excitement of the nerve CCII''''' 
i.e .• take into account unconscious physiological co;~~:: 
rather than conscious ones. That these 'errors' are r 
to be the oonn is the result of memory. which searches 
quickest possible explanation, in so doing repealing 'the 
of old interpretations'.S! 
In addition, Nietzsche also argues that we mis'*'mI1! 
tribute sensations such as pain to a particular location 
body 'without [their] being situated there':59 in other 
Nietzsche is contesting the view whereby it is corlSci .. 
which tells us where the cause of the pain is. Rather, 
of where the pain is, is projected afterwards as its 
effect. Nietzsche reverses the priority given to c~::: 
replacing it with the unconscious, arguing that the, 
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to consciousness is the result of the belief that only conscious 
causes are appropriate as explanations, 
3 J Th~ critiqu~ of soci~ty 
In his critique of society, Nietzsche uses the metonymic structure 
as the tool for his methodology, Anarchism, socialism, nihilism, 
pessimism. religious morality and various social problems func· 
tion as signs of something else, signs of what Nietzsche calls 
decadence, In other words, the decadence of society is the result 
of an examination of the social. political or religious mOvemenlS 
within it. 
Decadence is defined with the tenninology of misplaced 
causality essential to metonymy: thus, Nietzsche writes: 'basic 
insight regarding the nature of decadence: its suppos~d caus~s 
ar~ its consequtnus,'601lle pattern which has characterised the 
critique of religion and consciousness is repeated: the dec~ying 
physiological condition of mankind is the cause for there being 
these social movements which are a 'sign of decline, an idio· 
syncrasy ' ,61 lbe essential element in the interpretation of these 
movements is that they extemalise the cause of their ills: the 
necessity of externalisation is itself the sign which the cultural 
semiologist must read in order to be able to interpret the con· 
clition of society. Thus, Nietzsche's application of metonymy is 
evident in that an abstract noun62 is made the cause of a 
movement's or individual 's decadence: 'vice - the addiction to 
vice; sickness-sickliness; crime-criminality; celibacy·steriJity; 
hystericisrn-weakness of the will; alcoholism; pessimism; anar-
chism; libertism (also of the spirit)' ,61 
Social movements - anarchist and socialist - are the objeclS 
of Nietzsche's critique in Twilight oftht Idols; the anarchist and 
.x;ialisl demands for equal righlS and justice are representative 
of I panicular social fonnalion, ' as the mouthpiece of d~clin;ng 
Itnla of society' , 641be anarchisl/Socialist is unaware of why he 
II suffering, ralionalising his suffering so that he 'condemns, 
Cllumniates and INfouls society' :65 from the effect, Nietzsche 
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argues that the anarchisl/socialis( creates a cause of that effeci. 
a responsible 'other' upon whom they can focus their revenge. 
Revenge and resenttnent function - as with the Christian -
therapeutically. for in the act of judging and punishing, the 
tension stored within the individual is released. preventing the 
individual's self-destruction. 'What is common to both (social 
movements and Christianity], and unworthy in both, is thai: 
someone has to be to blame for the fact that one suffers.·66 
However. Nietzsche re-iterates that the alleged cures for 
decadence - changing the nature of society - are useless because 
the various movements do not understand the basis of their ills. 
Those who believe that psychological and moral cures influence 
the physiology of the decadent are mistaken: such cures 'do no( 
change the course of decadence, do not arrest it. are physiologio-
ally naught.·67 This explains why Nietzsche claims that 
who consider themselves 'cured' are anJy deluding 
For them the only possible type of cure would be 
TIle paradox of the 'cured' is that in uttering their 
reveal their delusion: 'the "cured" are merely one type of 
degenerates'.61 
in Niell.sche's diagnosis of the degenerate nature of 
movements and individuals which propagate themselves 
SOCiety, one particular type of individual within society 
out for praise: the genius. It is not the social context 
produces the genius, as widely believed, for this is a case 
causality. with the wrong cause - society - postulated as 
produced genius. Rather. Niell.sche argues that the genius 
product of an accumulation of energy which has been 
bLing 'historically and physiologically' such that the 
context only functions as a device which triggers off 
already present: thus 'if the tension in the mass has 
great, the merest accidental stimulus suffices to call the 
the . deed'. the great destiny, into the world'. 69 
It is clear that Nietzsche emphasises the ph:1S j(,lo;gic"UI 
as the 'true' causality within the genius: it is his nature 
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the crucial element, and not the social context, for 'the very same 
milieus can be interpreted and exploited in opposite ways: there 
are no facts',1. In other words, there is no necessary relationship 
between the social context and the genius, such that one is the 
cause of the other, Rather, this kind of claim makes the mistake 
of starting from the effect (genius) and moving to a cause (the 
social context) of that effect. Here, Nietzsche applies metonymy 
as a critic:tl tool against the 'neurotic's theory' of the 'milieu' 
which 'has become sacrosanct and almost scientific',n 
Other than his critique of the social context's relation to the 
genius, Nietzsche's concern with society is chiefly focused on 
the nature of movements present within it The movements 
which Nietzsche critic:izes are decadent precisely because they 
have not understood their own nature: in attempting to provide 
reasons for their predicament they have not recognised that their 
reasons constltute the signs of decadence. 
The recognition of the function of language within the 
Nietzschean corpus has been examined by a number of scholars. 
But the extent to which rhetorical devices influenced Nietzsche's 
critical strategies has been neglected. It is with this lacuna in 
mind that I have tried in this paper to offer a detailed eumin· 
Ilion of Nietzsche 's studies on metonymy and of his subsequent 
widespread application of those studies as an instrument for the 
ailique of religion, philosophy and society. 
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